

United States Overseas Military Bases  
Report to the President by Frank C. Nash,  
December 1957

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I. Introduction

In his presidency of 1953-1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower made a new military strategy called "New Look". It was very different from NSC68 adopted by the Truman administration in 1950. In NSC 68, it was declared that the United States should increase its military power rapidly to encounter the communist threat.

The United States faced a serious financial deficit when DDE came into the White House because of the Korean War and the enormous increase in military spending. President Eisenhower believed that deficits caused by the arms race would dangerously weaken the United States.

In order to decrease military spending, the "New Look" depended on nuclear weapons and "massive retaliation" as deterrence to Soviet aggression. The basic structure of the "New Look" consisted of expanded nuclear forces and much-reduced conventional forces. Alliances, psychological warfare, covert action, and negotiations were also important components of the strategy<sup>1)</sup>.

In the process of implementing the "New Look", the Eisenhower administration re-examined the US overseas military base system. DDE believed that the preservation of overseas bases was a "vital element" in

detering aggression and in the security of the United States and the free world. At the same time, President Eisenhower recognized that frictions arisen from stationing many US troops had shapen local opposition to US military forces in some host countries<sup>2)</sup>. The President believed that the United States must re-examine the base program to preserve US overseas presence over a long period of time.

On October 15, 1956, President Eisenhower wrote to Frank C. Nash, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. In the letter, DDE asked Nash to make recommendations with respect to the US overseas base system.

Nash presented a report to President Eisenhower in December 1957. The report examined the US overseas base system comprehensively. The Nash report came to be one of the important reports relating to the US overseas base system in the presidency of Eisenhower.

In the Nash report, there were many interesting recommendations relating to the US bases in Japan and Okinawa. For example, the report said, "This concentration of a major military potential with limited ground-to-air and antisubmarine defense capability makes Okinawa highly attractive and vulnerable target." It also stated, "it would seem desirable that consideration be given to gradual redeployment of appropriate units [in Okinawa] to other possible areas in the Far East in order to achieve greater flexibility and more adequate dispersion."<sup>3)</sup> In short, from the military point of view, the Nash

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1) See, John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, Oxford University Press, 1982 ; Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower : Soldier and President*, Simon & Schuster, 1990 ; Chester J. Pach, Jr., & Elmo Richardson, *The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, University Press of Kansas, 1991.

2) Letter, Eisenhower to Nash, October 15, 1956, *Documents of the National Security Counsel, Fifth Supplement*, University Publications of America, microfilm, reel 3.

3) Appendix United States Overseas Military Bases, Report to the President by Frank C. Nash, Country Studies, November 1957, *ibid.*

report recommended to withdraw some US forces from Okinawa.

In spite of the recommendation by the Nash report, the concentration of US bases to Okinawa has never changed. During the US occupation of 1945-1972, Okinawa was very convenient for activities of the US military forces, because the US military forces were able to use their bases freely there. Okinawa has been "the keystone of the Pacific" since the end of World War II. Even today, 30 years after the Okinawa-reversion of 1972, Okinawa still has a lot of serious problems caused by the numerous and extensive US bases. To know the history of US policy on Okinawa, it is good to read the books written by Seigen MIYAZATO, Masaaki GABE, Yasuko KONO, Nicholas E. Sarantakes, Robert D. Eldridge and others<sup>4)</sup>.

When it comes to the US bases on the mainland of Japan, the Nash report emphasized that "from the military point of view, Japan represents the most valuable US base complex in the Pacific area."<sup>5)</sup> On the other hand, the report pointed out a problem of the US bases in Japan. "In Japan, we have no assurance that we can count on the full use of our logistic complex or air bases to support hostilities in Korea or elsewhere, unless Japan should be directly involved."<sup>6)</sup> In this respect, the report recommended not only to strengthen US-Japan alliance but also to develop US bases in Australia as additional or supplementary facilities. In short, the Nash report described

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4) See, Seigen Miyazato, *Nichibeikankei to Okinawa 1945-1972 (US-Japan relations and Okinawa 1945-1972)*, Iwanami Shoten, 2000 ; Masaaki Gabe, *Okinawa-henkan towa nandattanoka (What was the Okinawa-reversion ?)*, NHK Books, 2000 ; Yasuko Kono, *Okinawa-henkan wo meguru seiji to gaiko (Politics and Diplomacy relating to Okinawa-Reversion)*, University Press of Tokyo, 1990 ; Nicholas E. Sarantakes, *Keystone*, Texas A&M University Press, 2000 ; Robert D. Eldridge, *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem*, Garland Publishing, 2001.

5) United States Overseas Military Bases, Report to the President by Frank C. Nash, December 1957, *Documents of the National Security Counsel, Fifth Supplement, op.cit.*

6) Appendix United States Overseas Military Bases, Report to the President by Frank C. Nash, Country Studies, November 1957, *op.cit.*

Japan as an unreliable ally. In the context of the tide of neutralism and strong anti-Americanism in Japan during the mid-1950s<sup>7)</sup>, the meaning of the above-mentioned analysis is understood.

The documents below with respect to the Far East, Japan and Okinawa are extracts from the Nash report and its appendix. However, the documents are not completely declassified and most of the still-classified sections are possibly related to the nuclear weapons<sup>8)</sup>.

## II. Documents

### 1. "United States Overseas Military Bases

Report to the President by Frank C. Nash, December 1957"

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7) There were many troubles caused by stationing numerous US forces in Japan. One of the most terrible crimes was "Girard-Case". On January 1957, US soldier William S. Girard shot and killed a Japanese Woman at Somagahara maneuver area in central Japan. It infuriated Japanese public very much and strong anti-Americanism spread throughout Japan.

8) On the nuclear weapons in Japan and Okinawa, see Masaaki GABE, *Nichibeikankei no nakano Okinawa (Okinawa in the US-Japan relations)*, San-ichi Shobo, 1996; Hans M. Kristensen, *Japan Under the Nuclear Umbrella: U.S. Nuclear Weapons And Nuclear War Planning in Japan During Cold War*, <http://www.nautilus.org>

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SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

The President's letter of October 15, 1956, attached as Annex A to this report, requested a wide-ranging study of all elements of the United States system of overseas military bases and operating facilities, together with recommendations based thereon regarding US base policies. It suggested that the study include a case-by-case analysis of the local situations where the United States has military operating rights and facilities, together with an analysis of the local political and economic factors affecting the maintenance of US facilities.

This study was initiated with a series of inquiries addressed to the chiefs

of US diplomatic missions in all countries where US military forces are now stationed, and to all US unified and specified commanders with responsibility for such forces. Simultaneously various basic data were assembled from sources within the Departments of State and Defense on individual country problems and certain problems common to many countries, such as criminal jurisdiction, and the economic considerations (quid pro quo) involved in the establishment and maintenance of our overseas bases. \*

\* Throughout this study the word "bases" has been used in its broadest sense to cover the installations and deployments of all elements of the US ground, sea, and air forces located outside the territory of the United States.

These data, together with the responses received from the field, are the raw materials upon which this study is based. They have in turn been supplemented by numerous discussions on political, military, and technical topics, including conversations and meetings with the Secretaries of State and Defense, other high officials of the Department of State, the Secretaries of the military departments, the Chairman and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, research and technical organizations forming part of, or affiliated with, the military departments, and several private individuals and commercial concerns operating on government contracts or in consultative capacities. These have been augmented by personal consultation with key US diplomatic and military officials abroad accomplished in the course of four field trips covering, respectively, the Caribbean area (in April), the Far East (in May), Europe and North Africa (in June and July), and Canada (in July). The results of the foregoing have been consolidated in a series of country studies, submitted as an Appendix to this report, which digest the more significant problems uncovered in the survey. They form the real basis for the report which follows.

The report will cover first a brief review of our present base structure, basic political and strategic factors involved in the US foreign base program, including consideration of probable trends over the next several years, and the conclusions which may be drawn therefrom. It will proceed with an analysis of certain political and military aspects of our present deployment arrangements on a regional and country basis, reaching conclusions and recommendations both specific and general. This will be followed by a more detailed review of current operating and administrative policies with recommended actions on various problems presented. It will conclude with certain recommendations for organizational adjustments at home and abroad designed to improve the administration of US foreign base policies.

## SECTION II

### THE PATTERN OF US BASE DEVELOPMENT

In 1947 we had only three base agreements as we know them now the 99-year Leased Bases Agreement with the United Kingdom, affording us facilities stretching from Newfoundland to British Guiana, most of which were then being deactivated, a 99-year base agreement with the Philippines, and an agreement of indefinite duration with Cuba covering Guantanamo Bay. At that time we retained occupation forces in Germany, Austria, and Japan, and maintained very limited support facilities elsewhere overseas, including air transit arrangements in the Azores, Iceland, and Saudi Arabia, and a small number of naval personnel in Morocco. A few troops remained in China, Korea, and Trieste, but these were being progressively withdrawn.

The situation today affords a striking contrast with its complex of overseas bases and deployments. For the first time, nations have in a time

short of actual war voluntarily accepted establishment on their soil of foreign bases and the indefinite deployment of friendly forces, sometimes within and sometimes outside the framework of an alliance. US forces are by agreement now stationed in 36 separate countries and foreign territories, exclusive of those other areas where only US military training and other missions are present, and make use of foreign real estate which totals over 4,000 square miles, an area roughly comparable in size to Connecticut. US military personnel outside US territory number about one million officers and men. \* With them are 23,000 civilian employees and over 400,000 dependent wives and children, making a total of approximately 1.5 million persons involved in or related to the US overseas base program. US base facilities on foreign territory represent an investment of many billions of dollars, \*\* and expenditures for the maintenance and development of these installations and forces each year put about 2.2 billion dollars into local economies and the international balance of payments. In addition, almost 350,000 local nationals are directly employed by US forces overseas.

\* 356,000 Army; 449,000 Navy and Marines, including 400,000 afloat or mobile; 232,000 Air Force, including rotational units. A substantial percentage of the afloat or mobile figure comprises men assigned to fleet units operating out of East and West Coast naval bases and are not therefore directly connected with US bases located on foreign territory.

\*\* Efforts have been made to obtain a fairly precise valuation of our overseas base complex, but the factors involved are so varied and complicated that any figure resulting from such efforts would be more misleading than helpful.

This system was conceived and developed in great part following the Communist attack in Korea and was given its greatest impetus by that

attack. Most of our major construction programs were initiated at that time on an urgent basis. In view of its swift growth it is not strange that the development of our base system was uneven and somewhat haphazard. The program has followed, nevertheless, both logically and pragmatically from the assumption by the United States of progressively greater responsibility for the military and political security of the Free World, which in turn has been based primarily on the conviction that this increased responsibility is in the primary interest of the domestic national security of the United States. Our present system of overseas facilities and deployments thus directly reflects our decision to participate in and support the NATO alliance, SEATO, and other multilateral and bilateral defense arrangements. It is remarkable that despite the early haste our overseas base system has turned out as well as it has, both in terms of location and in the actual experience of operation.

The period of general expansion has now passed its peak, and is leveling off due to the fact that most of our major requirements have been satisfied. We must, however, anticipate a lesser, but still important, number of future requirements ranging from installations to accommodate new weapons systems, improved and expanded communications, and early warning facilities, and various research and development projects. \* Certain negotiations are also currently under way. Earlier base agreements are being renegotiated or adjusted, and several immediate new requirements are also under discussion at government level. \*\* In addition, US commands overseas are continuously engaged in negotiating various technical arrangements at military level, ranging from relatively major matters to ad hoc operational considerations.

\* Major US military requirements are reviewed annually by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and published in a document entitled "United States Base Requirements

Overseas." This document by its terms, however, is approved for programming purposes only and is not to be regarded as a list of new requirements necessitating active or immediate negotiation. Individual items may be selected from the list by the military services from time to time as required by specific operational plans, and as funds are made available. These are then forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for review and subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State with the request that necessary negotiations with the foreign governments concerned be undertaken. Other possible future requirements such as long-range radar and related facilities for antiballistic missile projects, new test and training ranges, and future missile sites are currently under discussion but have not yet been approved by or included in the Joint Chiefs of Staff document.

\*\* A list of the negotiations actually in progress as of November 1, 1957 is attached at Annex B.

It has become increasingly difficult to secure more favorable arrangements in one country where US forces are stationed than in another. It is remarkable how closely one country follows the arrangements reached with another. This "common denominator" pattern means that compromises adopted to secure agreement to urgently needed requirements are being reflected more and more in the demands of other countries with whom we are negotiating and in several instances have suggested to other countries the advantage of renegotiating agreements already in effect. It means too that what one US military service negotiates at a technical level in one country can become a condition imposed on another US military service halfway around the world. It has thus become vitally important to define clearly our basic policies on all matters common to the establishment and operation of our overseas bases and to develop the most effective means possible of coordinating our actions in every country where US forces are

stationed. The time has long since passed when one service can make its own arrangements with a particular country, or, indeed, where the United States, as a government, can make arrangements with one nation without regard for possible repercussions with another.

### SECTION III

#### CONSIDERATIONS AS TO THE FUTURE

Before proceeding with an analysis of the elements of our base system, it is desirable to assess the probable development of this system over the next five to ten years, a period which accords generally with the accepted time for long-range military planning, and to examine certain basic political and military considerations relevant to this projection.

The following assumptions are fundamental to this examination:

(a) The major Sino-Soviet objective will continue to be the disruption of Free World alliances, the disintegration of our collective defenses, and the frustration of the US forward strategy. Basic to the achievement of these objectives is the forced withdrawal of US forces from overseas bases and the establishment of Communist positions of power penetrating the present containment perimeter. These objectives will be pursued through a vigorous combination of propaganda, subversion, direct threats, and possibly limited military action. Thus far the Communists' willingness to explore avenues toward disarmament have proven to be but diversionary tactics, and there is nothing presently visible on the horizon to indicate any intention on their part to go beyond such tactics.

(b) Our world-wide system of multilateral and bilateral alliances will endure, although it must be expected that these will be subjected to periodic strains, such as that presently evidenced in NATO, especially in newly independent regions where nationalism is strong and there are distasteful recollections of colonial status.

(c) Our base system and military deployments must be carefully planned to avoid pressing the Sino-Soviet bloc to the point that may incline them to miscalculate our objectives and conclude that our intentions have become aggressive, thereby making them feel obliged to react violently. This consideration is particularly relevant as regards the positioning of US atomic units, especially IRBM's, in areas close to the Communist periphery.

In addition to the influence of such policy considerations, account must be taken of the impact on our base system and force deployments of technological developments, new and advanced weaponry, and strategic requirements.

During the ensuing ten years, the means and methods of waging war will develop rapidly in the realm of technology. The offense is likely to maintain its advantage over the defense, and the opportunities for nuclear blackmail will increase. The distinction between all-out war and restricted conflicts will become more pronounced, but neither side can assume that only one type of war, a big one or a little one, will be fought. Both sides must therefore project their military power in every possible direction, using all the natural elements of land, sea, and air; to do this requires a diversified arsenal of weapons systems, both conventional and nuclear. At no time in our history has the United States depended as heavily for its defense as now on our ability to deliver a decisive retaliatory blow. In view of the fact that

geographic separation from our enemy and distance is fast becoming relatively inconsequential in the light of the weapons that will become operational within ten years, the physical security of the United States, as well as the maintenance of our position and influence in the world, will depend even more vitally than previously on a forward strategy and the existence of a well-positioned and well-dispersed system of overseas military bases and operating facilities.

We will have need of such a system, supplemented by forces and facilities maintained by our allies, in order (a) to maintain a deterrent to general war by assuring our capability to deliver a strategic counteroffensive, and by providing the dispersal necessary so that the enemy cannot calculate on erasing our retaliatory power through surprise attack by one blow; (b) to assure that we can maintain tactical forces in being at or close to potential trouble spots (supplemented by mobile forces maintained in central areas) so that a potential aggressor knows we are determined to assist indigenous forces in defending themselves and have varying military capacities for assisting them which can be used with discrimination as circumstances dictate; and (c) to promote US political objectives, giving tangible evidence of political solidarity with our friends and of our intention to honor our various defense alliances, and thereby encouraging the fullest contribution to the common defense on the part of our friends and allies.

#### The Strategic Deterrent

The swift changes taking place in weapons technology will have their effect on the base system supporting our strategic deterrent. At present that deterrent is the manned bomber of SAC and the Navy's carrier and

submarine striking forces, supplemented by the tactical forces at forward bases. It appears that these will continue to be the chief delivery vehicle of our long-range striking force for at least the next five to ten years. Manned aircraft will play an important military role for the foreseeable future. We have not yet developed a truly intercontinental bomber, and until the development of some revolutionary fuel makes this possible, we must continue to rely on overseas air bases for the multiple purposes related to our strategic air power. There may, however, be some consolidations possible (as, for example, in Spain and Morocco), and a reduction of the number of personnel manning them, through adoption of an austerity use program.

In the missile realm, the Soviet achievements evidenced by the satellite launching, and our determination to excel in this field, have accelerated our efforts to realize the military missile age. There is, however, a serious danger that overemphasis on the ICBM will give rise to a popular clamor to reduce our overseas bases and deployments and to rely solely on the retaliatory power of intercontinental missiles. Such arguments overlook the fact, pointed out above, that the needs of our strategic deterrent forces are only one element of the general requirement for overseas bases. Exclusive concentration on the ICBM would not meet the need for tactical forces in being or our broader political objectives. The IRBM as an additional element in our strategic deterrent forces, on the other hand, represents a capability which carries with it, and will carry with it even after the ICBM is available, opportunities both for complementing our tactical forces and for strengthening the political fabric of our essential collective security system.

Our first deployments of IRBM's (to the United Kingdom) are expected before 1959, and more will doubtless follow to other areas in Europe, the Mediterranean area, and the Far East. Although in some instances it is

feasible to position these weapons at or centered around existing air bases, the latter will not always be the most suitable locations, and new sites will have to be developed. Once the difficulties of obtaining agreements on the stationing of these missiles in foreign countries, and on the delicate matters relating to the nuclear warheads, have been resolved, there is the very serious problem of obtaining the rights to the actual launch locations and the accompanying logistic facilities (particularly those involved in the supply of liquid propellants, which will continue to complicate the problem until the solid propellant has been achieved). Since the untested state of these weapons prevents us from placing full reliance on them and reducing our dependence on the manned bomber, their employment will continue to make the base picture extremely complex.

Their range is such that they must be emplaced within 2,000 miles of the Sino-Soviet targets, and this automatically restricts their introduction to the NATO countries and relatively few areas in the Far East. Present weapons (with their liquid oxygen propellants) require an advanced industrial backup, and yet countries possessing these facilities are normally land poor. But, in view of the assumed Soviet ICBM capability and the resulting vastly increased vulnerability of the continental United States, our ability to retain the edge in the deterrent race requires the positioning of IRBM's at widely dispersed bases around the Sino-Soviet periphery.

In some instances, like the United Kingdom, it may be possible to provide the IRBM's to an ally, or to establish them under some multilateral arrangement like NATO infrastructure, in which case the United States would be relieved of the onus of acquiring and maintaining the launch sites. On the other hand, multilateral infrastructure may not be acceptable to all potential recipient countries, and all of the latter are not sufficiently advanced

to be able to handle these complicated systems. Accordingly, it appears likely that, even in the NATO area, the majority of initial deployments will be to US manned and operated bases.

Therefore, since the security of the United States requires that we maintain an overpowering strategic deterrent, some additional unilateral US bases will probably be needed in the immediate future. It may later prove feasible, as the range of our bombers is increased as a result of advances in technology, to balance these acquisitions by consolidation or reduction of existing strategic air bases.

#### Tactical Forces

In view of the ever-present possibility of local Communist aggression, the United States must maintain tactical forces in areas of particular strategic importance and sensitivity, and these forces will continue to have a variety of base requirements. These forces also form an important supplement to the main nuclear retaliatory forces. The increased Soviet bomber and missile threat calls for on our art and improved air defense deployments. The state of the art is not yet such that ground-to-air and ground-to-ground short-range missiles can be relied upon to supplant fighter and interceptor aircraft, thus there is need for locations or bases for each, at least for the next five to ten years.

Strong mobile ground forces, supplemented by tactical air forces, must either be located in positions from which they can readily respond to local aggression, or else be rapidly transportable to these critical areas. No matter how mobile these forces may be made, by sea or by air, they will depend on adequate logistics support, and this means overseas bases and facilities.

Without, for example, the elaborate base system in Japan, which developed from our postwar occupation status, our efforts in the Korean conflict would have been incomparably more difficult of accomplishment. Our naval task forces, such as the Sixth and Seventh Fleets, while relying to the maximum on "underway replenishment" techniques, will continue for some time to depend on overseas shore-based support for maintenance, repair, and ammunition storage. Nuclear propulsion of our Navy will eventually reduce fuel storage needs, but for the foreseeable future the Navy will continue to rely on prepositioned fuel stocks in overseas areas. Formerly, the bases and facilities of our close allies, the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands, relieved us in large measure of the necessity for the farflung complicated system of bases that we now maintain, but our allies' base potential has been so reduced that it can now provide almost negligible assistance in this respect.

{Classified}

### Conclusion

Our base system is key to our survival as a nation. If this system is so organized as to demonstrate our strength and our readiness to meet all types of military action, there is solid reason to believe that our policy of containment will succeed, that total war will be avoided, and that limited aggression can be smothered. The foregoing analysis of the political and military aspects of probable US requirements over the next ten years leads to the conclusion that their general scope and pattern are not likely to diminish in size and complexity during this period. It is certain, however, that adjustments and shifts in emphasis will occur as we adjust our strategic doctrine to the range of new weapons, improvements in the mobility and fire power of our tactical forces, and the political or military vulnerability of

particular overseas areas. The central problem emerging from this conclusion, therefore, becomes one of how the United States can maintain substantially its present overseas base complex over that period, recognizing that to maintain it calls for a positive but flexible approach in our relations with our allies, and in the formulation and administration of our own policies.

#### SECTION IV

#### REGIONAL AND COUNTRY ANALYSES

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#### C. THE FAR EAST

The attitude of those Far East countries where we now have bases can be described as generally friendly to the United States, but even a superficial look reveals forces operating just beneath the surface which could bring about decided changes in this orientation. These Asian nations, with the exception of Korea and the Chinese Republic, do not regard the Sino-Soviet bloc as the immediate militant threat that we do. They are preoccupied with their internal affairs, and are inclined to allow the day-to-day irritants of US military presence obscure the fundamental purpose of why we are there. Our problem, therefore, is to convince these nations that US bases on their territories are not solely for US protection; US forces, as projections of US military power stationed on their territories at their invitation, protect them from attack and domination, and are therefore not an infringement, but the best possible recognition and safeguard of their national sovereignty.

Neutralism and nationalism are strong trends in most Asian countries. They will become more pronounced as long as the Sino-Soviets do not make

overt threats or moves against the non-Communist nations. As time passes without obvious threats, therefore, pressures in Asia are likely to build up for the reduction or withdrawal of US military forces without regard to the fact that no country or combination of countries could stand up to the Sino-Soviet bloc without being able to count on the immediate aid of substantial US forces in being. Although, for example, there has recently been some indication of a realization by the Japanese of the security implications of the withdrawal of our ground combat forces from Japan, neutralism still exerts a strong pull, and the Japanese do not appear yet ready to accept the obligations of a collective effort in the interest of real mutual security.

Even without external pressures, the requirements of our own strategy and budgetary considerations have required and will continue to require adjustments in our base deployments in the Far East. Our present defense chain in the area has serious weaknesses in every link. In Japan, we have no assurance that we can count on the full use of our logistic complex or air bases to support hostilities in Korea or elsewhere, unless Japan should be directly involved. Okinawa is so highly concentrated a military base that it is extremely vulnerable to air and submarine attack (to say nothing of IRBM's from the Chinese mainland). Although Taiwan now represents a strong military bastion, the death of Chiang Kai-shek could weaken the resolve of the Chinese Republic and open the way for a possible understanding with the Chinese Communists. The security of our bases in the Philippines, despite the results of the recent election, rests on a none too stable internal political situation. Korea represents a special situation, and our sizable ground forces there are tied down to a particular mission, and therefore have no deployment flexibility.

Our ability to contain communism in the Far East is every bit as

important as in Europe or elsewhere. The essential strategy is the same, although, of course, it is adapted to suit the geography of the area. Forces must be deployed to handle localized threats and as evidence of our determination to protect the free nations there. Bases must exist to support these forces and to provide air and missile launching sites within reasonable distance of the main land. In view of the weaknesses noted above in our present defense perimeter and the increased threat inherent in Soviet missile achievements, it is recommended that alternatives to our present base system be examined for the dual purpose of increasing dispersion and of establishing bases in the most politically reliable areas.

A number of possible alternatives exist - in the Bonin and Mariana Island groups, North Borneo, Brunei, and Australia. The Bonins and Marianas have the great advantage of being under US control; they already contain US installations, and are strategically well located.

[Classified]

North Borneo and Brunei are under British control and have the advantage of being strategically located in relation to the vital areas of Southeast Asia. The British would welcome our military presence there, but facilities would have to be developed at considerable cost. Australia has obvious disadvantages from a geographic standpoint, but, as air and atomic means of transportation are further developed, this will not in the future be the shortcoming it is now. Besides, Australia is a number one ally, and has indicated her desire to have the United States establish bases and facilities on her territory. The Australian continent offers the only possible future alternative to the industrial complex now provided in Japan for the support of US forces in this area.

Because of her remote geographical position (which has its advantages as well as drawbacks), consideration should be given to transferring to Australia a portion of our "moth-balled" merchant fleet, and to establishing stockpiles of surplus grain and other provisions there. If, as seems likely, the aftermath of an atomic war involving Europe, Russia, and the United States would be characterized by acute shortages of food and transport, it would seem prudent to develop now a reserve stockpile of both in a place relatively secure from the immediate consequences of a global atomic conflict.

The variety of military challenges posed by the Communists in Asia requires us to maintain a corresponding variety of defense capabilities, bases and forces. We must both establish our bases in reliable areas, and disperse our deployments so that the Sino-Soviets cannot cripple our retaliatory power in a single massive assault. Such a program will be costly, but the alternative to a soundly based defense perimeter in the West Pacific is retreat to "Fortress America, " which would be infinitely more costly in every respect. It is not a question of withdrawing entirely from any country. This would be considered by our friends as abandonment, and they would feel compelled to make concessions to the Communists even while pursuing a policy of neutralism. The need is for alternate positions which will protect us by dispersion and afford insurance against a situation developing in the present host countries that would lead us to a decision to withdraw.

US military presence in these countries adequate to guarantee our support and protection is their best assurance of true independence. Realizing this, they wish to see tangible evidence of our ability to project our strength to meet local Communist aggression on the mainland of Southeast Asia as well as full-scale attack against themselves. It is therefore to our political advantage to maintain tactical forces in being appropriately deployed

in the area. At the present time, the Seventh Fleet is practically the only force in being and on the spot to fill this need. In other forces we are noticeably weak (and our allies in the area are taking notice of it); the few Marines on Okinawa lack mobility, and our tactical air arm is too limited to cover the area adequately.

SEATO, though possibly adequate to fulfill its specific purpose, is neither designed for nor capable of providing a collective security vehicle for the entire Far East. The organization is confronted with a variety of problems, some of them basic in nature. For example, there seems no early possibility of rectifying such basic flaws as its limited Asian membership, and the fact that no two SEATO members are geographically contiguous.

SEATO's main defense concept is based upon maintaining mobile striking power at selected points which can be brought quickly to bear against an aggressor. SEATO is therefore particularly dependent upon US mobile striking power and upon US bases in the Far East from which this power can be rapidly projected. It follows that any weakening of our base complex in the Far East would have an unsettling effect, not only upon SEATO as an organization but upon the political and psychological outlook of individual countries in the SEATO area. Perhaps no group of Free World countries is more dependent on US support than those in the SEATO area. Signs of withdrawal or a slackening of US interest in their security and welfare might well cause them to shift toward accommodation with the nearby Communist colossus.

In Asia, lack of the ingredients which made NATO possible in Europe, the many and complex political problems, and the vast differences in living standards and cultures make the US position difficult and delicate.

Accommodation, insofar as possible, to the legitimate demands of national sovereignty, tangible evidence of our determination to resist aggression by force if necessary, and, above all, patience, will be required to bring the Asian nations to a full realization of the interdependence of their security with that of the United States.

### Japan

Japan constitutes the northern anchor of the offshore island chain and provides important US military bases in close proximity to the sources of Sino-Soviet power in the Far East. The bulk of our tactical air strength in Asia is still based in Japan; we operate extensive repair and maintenance facilities there for land and naval forces; and the logistical support for US commitments in Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia is still dependent in large measure upon Japanese bases. From the military point of view, Japan represents the most valuable US base complex in the Pacific area. It is not only the great strategic prize in the area; it also affords port facilities, tool shops, skilled labor, and industrial back-up that could not be duplicated elsewhere in Asia. No comparable logistical base for supporting our current offense in the cold war could be established west of Hawaii, and possibly not west of California or north of Australia. It is, therefore, essential to US security that Japan become militarily secure and remain politically aligned with the United States. Even if there were a present alternative to the varied base complex in Japan, we could not permit the Japanese industrial reservoir and military potential to be used against us.

The measure of our task is found in the present contradiction in Japanese attitudes. They desire to remain under the protective wing of US military power and to enjoy the considerable economic benefits from our presence;

but they equally desire to assert their national independence by removing symbols of foreign control, subordinating the presence of our military or removing them altogether. Japan's basic objective is to achieve a position of equality with the United States; our objective is to conclude a collective security arrangement whereby our bases in Japan will continue to be available, but wherein Japan will assume a growing share of the common defense.

The most important step toward erasing the Japanese feeling of inequality, and thereby placing our long-term relations with Japan on a sounder basis, is revision of the Security Treaty. The need for revision is not merely to bolster Japanese ego - it is a political necessity in order to establish a relationship wherein equal partners assume proportionate shares of the burden of restricting the spread of Communist aggression. Precipitate action would be a mistake; careful political timing is necessary, and the US program should be designed to retain as much of our military presence in Japan as we deem necessary for our mutual security. Particularly is this important as regards naval facilities and air bases for both SAC and TAC. In addition, we should seek agreement under any new treaty relationship for the right of re-entry under military necessity to those bases required to meet the situation. As US forces are withdrawn, the Japanese must be persuaded of the necessity of themselves meeting the needs of the defense of their homeland. This will call for an unslackening buildup of the Self Defense Force, which the United States should push even to the point of turning over to the Japanese defense tasks which the Self Defense Force may not yet be fully qualified to accomplish, but which, under the pressure of responsibility, they can learn to handle.

[Classified]

A possible alternative lies in the Bonin Islands, and we should make clear to the Japanese that as we withdraw forces from Japan the Bonins become more important and necessary to us from the point of view of military facilities. For this reason we cannot permit repatriation of the islanders as long as the islands are under our control. Temporizing measures along this line, such as permitting visits to the graveyards of relatives, can only build up cumulatively into a situation such as the one now confronting us in Okinawa.

Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa)

Pressures in Japan, and sentiment in the Ryukyus for reversion of the islands to Japan, pose the most difficult problem for the continued stability of our key bases on Okinawa. The security of the area requires US military presence in the Ryukyus for the indefinite future, and therefore it must constantly be emphasized that the US position in the islands is not a negotiable matter. While remaining firm on this point, however, the United States should canvass ways and means to reduce the present military concentration on Okinawa for strategic reasons.

Having thus to stay indefinitely in Okinawa and the Ryukyus, we must without further delay face up to the long-term economic and political obligations that confront us. Since circumstances require that we exercise virtually permanent supervision over the Okinawan people, we must recognize that the US political system is on public display in Asia and that we must take steps to assure that it operates in such a way as to impress Asians favorably. The stakes are such that we must not fail to acquit ourselves with credit.

Our administration of the Ryukyus, which stems from Article 3 of the Japanese Peace Treaty, is exercised in accordance with an Executive Order. Although the US Civil Administration, operating in conjunction with the native government of the Ryukyus, appears to be providing good government, Ryukyuan sentiment for reversion to Japan continues strong owing to cultural ties, the ambiguous position of the Ryukyus as a people without a country, and short memories regarding the Japanese record of exploitation and neglect.

Land expropriation on Okinawa has been a very difficult problem, and despite the lump sum payment formula devised by the Special Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, there is lingering resentment on the part of the owners. Further large-scale requirements would rekindle the issue, which has high propaganda value for anti-American groups, and must be avoided.

The problem of the Ryukyuan attitude toward atomic weapons did not arise until very recently; but on August 23, 1957, the local legislature unanimously passed a resolution which called for a discontinuation of base construction for atomic weapons on Okinawa. The text expressed the fear that such construction would lead in time to "annihilation of the entire Okinawan population." For the purpose of combatting this psychological problem, as well as for important economic objectives, consideration should be given to the idea advanced by the Special Subcommittee of the House for the development of a nuclear power grid on the island.

Militarily, Okinawa is highly vulnerable to air and to submarine attack, owing to the concentration of airfields, ports, storage facilities, and troop training areas, all necessarily located on or adjacent to the coast. Adequate

dispersal is not possible and it is therefore difficult to see how this vulnerability can be significantly reduced in the immediate future, except by removing particular units or facilities to other possible areas in the Far East. Some reduction in vulnerability could be achieved by providing aircraft revetments, building concrete shelters for personnel and equipment, and otherwise taking a variety of measures designed to "harden" the bases.

With the advent of IRBM and related missiles, it is important to bear in mind that of the islands in the Ryukyus group under US control, perhaps as many as 50 would be suitable for missile launching sites. This island group could feasibly (but, of course, expensively) become a well-dispersed missile base, posing a severe deterrent threat to southern and central China, while at the same time being itself difficult to destroy. It is recommended that exploratory studies along this line be undertaken immediately.

[略]

#### The Mariana, Marshall, and Caroline Islands

In the light of military reductions in Japan, and what is believed to be the necessity of looking for suitable alternative base areas, it is desirable that immediate consideration be given to reactivating certain of our World War II bases on Saipan and Tinian, and, perhaps, the naval facilities at Ulithi. Re-establishing certain of these bases in the central Pacific would also permit a desirable dispersal of those SAC forces now concentrated at Guam, and of other air and naval forces crowded into the congestion of Okinawa.

There appear to be no legal obstacles to the introduction of military bases and forces into these islands, which are held as a Strategic Trust Territory by

the United States. No doubt a US move to re-establish air and naval bases in these islands would occasion some sharp criticism from the Soviet bloc, and perhaps, from India, both of which are members of the United Nations Trusteeship Council. Such criticism would probably not be either sustained or consequential, particularly if the timing and scale of our return were handled with due consideration for world opinion, and if a straightforward explanation were given. In any event, the advantage of gaining a more flexible and better balanced position in the central Pacific, as a partial offset to our withdrawals from Japan, would seem to outweigh the political risks.

2. "Appendix United States Overseas Military Bases  
Report to the President by Frank C. Nash, Country Studies,  
November 1957"

JAPAN

I. Major US Facilities and Installations

- |             |                              |
|-------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Zama     | – Headquarters Facility (A)  |
| 2. Yokosuka | – Headquarters Facility (N)  |
| 3. Fuchu    | – Headquarters Facility (AF) |

Army

Port Facilities	8 locations
Troop Housing	42 locations
Training and Maneuver Areas	15 locations
Depots	18 locations
Hospitals	5 locations
Communications Facilities	10 locations
POL Storage	6 locations

United States Overseas Military Bases (Yoshitsugu)

Navy

Naval Bases	2 locations
Port Facilities	5 locations
Air Stations	4 locations
Submarine Sanctuaries	2 locations
Storage Facilities	2 locations
Communications Facilities	5 locations

Air Force

Air Bases	14 locations
Depots	5 locations
Communications Facilities	13 locations
Bomb and Gunnery Ranges	15 locations
Hospitals	2 locations

II. Total Acreage Used by US Forces

266,603 Acres

III. US Defense Personnel \* (March 31, 1957)

<u>Service</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>US Civilians</u>	<u>Dependents</u>
Army	29,049	4,199	26,532
Navy	6,996	609	4,812
Marine	13,259	—	448
Air	50,568	1,974	36,054
Total	99,872	6,782	67,846

Note: The above figures do not include personnel present in Japan from afloat and mobile forces or who rotate through Japan from other commands for leave and recreation purposes.

\* Prior to planned withdrawal of 39, 556 military personnel of all services.

IV. Foreign Employees of US Force (March 31, 1957)

127, 530

Mission of US Forces

The US military presence in Japan is represented by almost every type of major and minor establishment required for triservice military operations . The Army maintains headquarters and troop housing facilities, port facilities, maneuver areas, storage facilities , hospitals , and communications facilities . The Navy maintains naval bases, headquarters, naval air stations, and submarine sanctuaries, in addition to hospital, storage, and communications facilities. The Air Force maintains air bases, air depots , and bomb or gunnery ranges , together with headquarters, communications, and navigational facilities. There is an unfulfilled requirement for three LORAN Station sites scheduled for occupancy in FY 1960, but it is possible these stations may be operated by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF).

[Classified]

US military forces are stationed in Japan for the external defense of Japan, to provide logistic and strategic support of US and United Nations forces in Korea and logistic support for military assistance programs and other defense activities in the Asian area, and to secure and maintain the northern end of our Pacific defense perimeter. The US military base complex in Japan supports these missions and also supplies logistic support and training for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.

It is expected that all US ground combat forces currently stationed in Japan, plus some naval and air forces, will be withdrawn prior to FY 1959. This withdrawal is being phased over a period of months. Concomitant with this reduction, certain troop housing maneuver areas, training, and supporting facilities will be scheduled for release during this period.

### Governing Agreements

The US military presence in Japan is governed basically by the Security Treaty of 1951 (UNCL), which entered into force in 1952. Implementing this treaty is the Administrative Agreement (UNCL) of the same date which governs such matters as jurisdiction, claims, customs, operating rights, cost sharing and taxes. Subsequently, various protocols have amplified or modified this agreement. Among them are agreements relating to the sharing of claims, jurisdiction over US personnel, and the reduction of the Japanese financial contribution to support of US forces in Japan. NATO Status of Forces arrangements are in effect with respect to jurisdiction. These are supplemented by a classified minute (CONF) in which the Japanese agree to waive their primary right to jurisdiction except in cases of material importance to Japan. This is substantively the equivalent of the "NATO-Netherlands Formula." In addition, the Mutual Defense-Assistance Agreement of 1954 (UNCL) provides for the furnishing of military equipment, materiel and services.

### Local Forces

Japan's military establishment is currently inadequate to meet its own defense requirements without substantial US assistance. Up to the present time Japan's defense effort has been limited more by the politically expedient

decisions of her government than by her inherent economic capability. Devoting a smaller proportion (less than 2 per cent) of her gross national product to defense expenditures than most of the other countries to which the United States gives military assistance, Japan has slipped progressively farther behind even her own modest force goals. These goals call for forces-in-being in 1961 to number 180,000 ground troops, a maritime force of 34,000 men with a fleet of 123,900 tons, and an air arm of 42,000 men with 1,300 planes. The current strength of the JSDF shows a Ground Self-Defense Force of 143,000 men, a Maritime Self-Defense Force of 22,416 men with a vessel tonnage of 62,000 tons and 81 aircraft, and an Air Self-Defense Force of 14,434 men equipped with 542 aircraft. At its present strength the Japanese Self-Defense Forces cannot contribute in any material way to Free World defense in the Far East, except as it relates to an attack on Japan.

#### General Orientation

Japan maintains close relations with the United States and is generally aligned with the Free World. Japan is gradually intensifying its efforts, however, to attain a more independent posture on the international scene and if possible a position of leadership in the Afro-Asian bloc. The Japanese are particularly anxious to attain a position of equality in their relations with the United States. While in the course of Prime Minister Kishi's visit to Washington much was accomplished to establish relations between Japan and the United States on a more acceptable basis of sovereign equality, remnants of a relationship viewed by Japan as unequal remain, particularly in the field of security and defense arrangements. Our base relations with Japan will therefore continue to be marked by Japanese efforts to erase any signs of inequality.

It should be borne in mind when considering Japan's alignment with the United States that the real tie lies not in a sharing of common culture and ideological convictions but in the fact that at present Japan's essential trading patterns are most satisfactorily accommodated by the alignment. At the same time, Japan, being anxious to preserve its way of life, finds it in Japan's defense interests to cooperate with the Free World community, particularly the United States. While some adjustments within the range of points now at issue between the United States and Japan will facilitate retention of base rights in Japan, the sine qua non of the relationship is to ensure the availability of raw materials and export markets in the Free World which now greatly surpass that which the Communist bloc might supply.

The present Japanese attitude toward the idea of collective security is consciously negative: Japan wishes to avoid any arrangement which might necessitate sending Japanese troops abroad for fear of becoming involved in an atomic war. These Japanese attitudes are reinforced by Article IX of Japan's Constitution which restricts the nation's military to that of a self-defense role. The Japanese have urged the rapid but orderly withdrawal of US forces, but Kishi and others appreciate that Japan must still rely in the defense field on the United States - the extent being determined by Japan's ability and determination to modernize her own defenses.

Barring a serious threat of general war, Japan will probably continue to align herself politically and militarily with the United States. Should a serious threat of general war arise, Japan might try to avoid the possibility of nuclear destruction by seeking to disengage from her treaty obligations with the United States and to establish a position of neutrality. Even without such threat, Japan will continually seek to adjust relations with the United States to a position of greater equality, particularly by means of treaty review.

Because Japan might prove to be an unreliable operational and logistic base in the event of active hostilities or other major crises, the question arises as to the desirability of finding alternatives to Japanese and perhaps those other Far Eastern bases which might be rendered less tenable due to the tides of nationalism and neutralism. Apart from obvious shortcomings arising from her geographic location, Australia's political orientation and general stability are such that she could provide us with the most reliable bases in the Far East. Given Australia's record in times of crisis, there is little question as to its future reliability and effectiveness as an ally. On the other hand, a withdrawal of bases and logistic activities from Japan to Australia at this time would have important adverse effects. It would weaken the US-Japanese alignment, conjure up a picture of the United States relying only on its white friends, and of the United States developing a fortress-Australia and fortress-US strategy. Besides, Australia is too distant from Northeast Asia to support easily operations in that area. It follows that Australia might be developed as an additional or supplementary base, but not at the expense of present operational and logistic base arrangements in Japan.

#### Problems and Recommendations

Japan's return to full international status, together with strong Japanese undercurrents of nationalism, neutralism and atomic fears, contribute to Japanese pressures for disengagement and for having the United States withdraw its extensive base system from Japan. The central problem is to gain Japanese acceptance for the continuation of required US base operations in Japan and to have the Japanese take over responsibilities for their own defense as rapidly as possible.

Until recently, the United States has been able to maintain its extensive

base system in Japan with surprisingly little resistance from the Japanese Government. In the post-Security Treaty period, the Japanese have not welcomed our bases but have tolerated them because of the slowness of the revival of Japanese nationalism from a "disgraceful" national defeat, their dependence on the United States for security protection, and the economic benefits deriving from US base operations in Japan (\$467 million in 1956). The fact that the Conservatives rather than the Socialists were in power all during the postwar period has also been a key factor in retaining Japanese tolerance for our military presence. For it must be appreciated that our base rights and facilities in Japan today are essentially an outgrowth of the occupation period. In fact the Japanese, who had no defense capability when the occupation ended in April 1952, were obliged to acquiesce in the continuance of US military presence as a condition for the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace. Moreover, at the time of the conclusion of the Security Treaty, the Korean War was in progress and most Japanese desired the continued stationing of American forces in Japan to insure the security of Japan and the continuance of some \$500 million per year of economic benefits deriving from US base operations, which were particularly needed in a period while Japan was struggling back economically. Thus our military presence in Japan arose initially not from alliance but from Japanese dependence.

Twelve years have now elapsed since the termination of hostilities and almost six years since the signing of the Security Treaty. Japan has become a full-fledged member of the international community and seeks to pursue an independent course in world affairs. In view of its extensive economic recovery, Japan no longer feels dependent upon the United States, although it continues to recognize the considerable material advantages in close US-Japanese ties. Increasing Japanese nationalism, neutralism and atomic fears

are contributing to growing Japanese pressures for disengagement and for having the United States withdraw its extensive base system from Japan.

Fortunately, Japanese pressures for disengagement coincide with reduced US requirements in Japan. The planned 40 per cent reduction in US forces in Japan during FY 1958 will go far in reducing these pressures and resolving some minor issues that arise from US presence. On the other hand, these planned reductions will cause Japan to lose considerable income and give rise to balance of payments difficulties. They will also create specific problems of layoffs of Japanese personnel working on the bases and reduction of income of merchants in certain localized areas.

Meeting Japanese desires for a reduction of the US base system in Japan of our own volition strengthens the position of Prime Minister Kishi, weakens the Socialist opposition's campaign against US bases, and will place the United States in a favorable position to negotiate for long-term base rights in Japan. The Japanese, confronted with increased responsibility for their own defense, will, it is hoped, be able to evaluate in a more realistic atmosphere the desirability of Japan utilizing modern weapons for its own defense. In this connection, experience indicates that direct or obvious attempts on our part to influence the rate of increase or character of the Japanese forces have had little effect and have even caused a stiffening of the Japanese position.

Irritations and points of friction resulting from our base presence in Japan exist but are surprisingly few considering the size of our forces and the duration of our stay. This speaks well for the behavior of our troops and for Japanese forbearance and discipline. The principal trouble spots have been: (a) charges that US facility requirements are excessive and wasteful; (b) US-Japanese differences over the rate of Japanese rearmament and Japan's

yen contribution in support of US forces; (c) runway extensions; (d) problems involved in the employment of some 200,000 Japanese; (e) compensation questions; (f) jet noise. Jurisdiction has not been a problem in Japan except in the Girard case, which may, however, presage further problems in this field.

In brief, the problem is not so much the irritants arising from American presence as the treaty arrangement itself, the reluctance of Japan to enter into a mutual security arrangement, profound Japanese fear of nuclear war, and such questions as the status of the Bonins and Ryukyus. The following recommendations are suggested for dealing with these issues (except the Ryukyus which is treated in a separate paper

Collective Security Arrangements: Japanese reluctance to enter into a collective security arrangement is influenced by doubts as to the possibility of an effective defense of Japan against nuclear attack and the belief that it will be possible for Japan to assume a position of neutrality if confronted with the threat of a general war. While it will be extremely difficult to convince Japan to the contrary, Japanese identification with common defense efforts might be heightened by utilizing the period of withdrawal of US forces from Japan to consult with the Japanese, presumably through the new US-Japanese Committee on Security or an ad hoc group of that Committee, on combined planning and operations. In this process we should (a) attempt to convince the Japanese that recent history underscores the fact that a peripheral country can best avoid Communist domination by reliance on collective security, and that the United States believes attack unlikely as long as adequate deterrent forces are maintained through the mechanism of collective security, and (b) seek as appropriate to reach preliminary understanding with the Japanese on long-term treaty arrangements to provide for the continued use of air and naval bases and a logistic complex by

US forces in Japan as long as required, as well as re-entry and other rights following the withdrawal of US forces.

Treaty Revision: The Japanese point out that the treaty unilaterally grants the United States indefinite rights to station troops in Japan and to use such forces regardless of Japan's own wishes, in some cases for purposes irrelevant to the direct defense of Japan, thereby raising the possibility of involving Japan in outside hostilities. Although not an immediate problem, revision or replacement of the Security Treaty is a long-term necessity. Since nothing short of treaty review will provide a basis for solving the basic issues involved in the long-term continuation of a viable military base system in Japan, our actions should be shaped toward concluding a new treaty or a revision of the present treaty which will provide for our minimum essential strategic requirements. It would be far better to offer to change the treaty than to be publicly pressured into it by the Japanese. All this requires careful advance spadework and, quite possibly, a greater Japanese understanding and acceptance of modern weapons. A favorable political climate will also be required; yet failure to act in time might produce such a bad political climate that we would lose all chances of preserving any form of military relationship with Japan.

[Classified]

Removing Irritations: Present plans for extensive withdrawals of US forces from Japan will do much to alleviate problems arising from the US presence. However, the following additional steps might be taken to reduce irritations and points of friction resulting from US bases: (a) reduce Japan's yen contribution to the support of US forces in Japan as those forces are withdrawn; (b) expand troop-community relations programs; (c) institute as

standard operating procedure the system of solatium payments in cases involving US personnel and individual Japanese (these should not only be made promptly but strictly in accord with the ritual practiced by the Japanese themselves); (d) establish a procedure that will permit quick claims settlements when made in the name of the United States Government; (e) establish a system of separation allowances and any other appropriate procedures for Japanese employees dismissed by reason of general force reductions.

The Bonins: Japanese leaders, strongly backed by Japanese opinion, have been pressing the United States to permit the repatriation to the Bonin Islands of at least a few hundred of the former inhabitants who were removed to Japan by the Japanese military authorities in 1944 to prevent their annihilation in the face of the then approaching hostilities.

Until recently it has been difficult for the United States to justify a policy of refusing repatriation on the grounds of military security in view of (a) the fact that we have virtually no installations now on the Bonins, and (b) the presence of a large native population in the Ryukyus where the United States has far greater security interests and whose status is akin to that of the Bonins. Moreover, the United States has created an unfortunate racial issue by allowing the repatriation shortly after the war of about 170 Bonin Islanders of mixed blood who were descendants of early Caucasian settlers.

The recent decision to withdraw large numbers of United States troops and facilities from Japan makes our position on nonrepatriation a good deal more tenable. The Marianas-Bonins offer the most logical area for redeploying certain facilities to be withdrawn from Japan, and the Japanese should be so informed. Obviously almost all the limited space on these small



United States Overseas Military Bases (Yoshitsugu)

Marine Base and training areas            3 locations

Air Force

Air Bases and fields                         7 locations

Air Depot                                        1 location

Communications facilities                 1 location

Ranges    4 locations

II. Total Acreage Used by US Forces

39,861 Acres

III. US Defense Personnel (March 31, 1957)

<u>Service</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>US Civilians</u>	<u>Dependents</u>
Army	5,183	1,582	6,149
Navy	488	22	152
Marine	9,996*	—	1
Air	9,739	476	5,404
Total	25,406	2,080	11,706

\*Will be increased by 12,000 from Japan.

IV. Foreign Employees of US Forces (March 31,1957)

16,847

Mission of US Forces

US military forces are stationed on the Ryukyu Islands under provisions of the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951, which grants the United States sole authority over the Islands. The islands are governed by the US Civil Administration for the Ryukyu Islands under a military High Commissioner who is also Commander of the US Army, Ryukyu Islands (USARYIS) and

CINCPACREP, Ryukyu Islands.

Okinawa is the site of all major US installations in the Ryukyu Islands. US forces stationed there are a major link in the US Pacific defense perimeter. The complex of bases is representative of most major installations required for tri-service operations, both offensive and defensive.

In explanation of the status of the Ryukyus, the President has reaffirmed the US position that Japan possesses residual sovereignty over the islands (Joint Communique issued by the President and the Prime Minister of Japan on June 21, 1957). He pointed out, however, that so long as conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East the United States will find it necessary to continue the present status.

#### General Orientation

Ryukyuan attitudes toward the United States are difficult to assess. Most Ryukyuan leaders recognize the economic benefits which the United States has brought to the islands, and many individual Okinawans recognize the improvement in their individual situation as compared to before the war. However, this feeling of acceptance of US presence on economic grounds is not shared by most of those many thousands who have been deprived of the use of their land in return for a proposed lumpsum compensation. The average Ryukyuan does not resent, the higher standard of living of the American, and troop-community relations are generally good, due largely to the Command efforts in this respect. It is, of course, hard for the Ryukyuan to understand American methods and outlook - to say nothing of an almost complete lack of appreciation for the US military objective in being in the islands - but the Ryukyuan are a philosophical, patient and friendly people.

It is perhaps these national characteristics which, more than anything else, have so far provided a tolerable political atmosphere for our occupation of the islands.

On the other hand, the converging forces of anticolonialism, atomic fears, and Ryukyuan reversionist sentiment pose a formidable challenge to the fulfillment of our mission in the islands. The election of a pro-Communist mayor of Naha, the capital city, is merely a storm warning. Clearly it behooves us to administer these islands with the greatest wisdom and understanding if we are to keep these antagonistic forces within manageable bounds. We must also bear in mind that the Ryukyus are the only place in the world today where the United States is in control of a large foreign population and where the United States is therefore vulnerable to damaging charges of colonialism. What the United States does in these islands on the very doorstep of Asia therefore assumes widespread significance. If we fail in this regard, an internal situation could arise in the Ryukyus which might negate the very purposes of our central military mission.

#### Problems and Recommendations

The dominant problem we face in the Ryukyus is coping with reversionist sentiments, which are strongly encouraged by the statements and actions of the Japanese people and government. The only effective way of dealing with this reversionist problem is by making it clear to the Ryukyuans and to the Japanese that it is the firm intention of the United States to remain in the island for many years to come and that meanwhile our position in the islands is not negotiable. Such a clarification of intentions would forestall further speculations and deflate hopes that reversion may occur within the next decade or so. This course has in fact been followed

since the promulgation of the Executive Order, and the Ryukyuan people have tended to accept this philosophically enough. However, it has increased their expectations and demands that since they are in effect long-term wards of the United States, we should do much more than we are doing in the field of direct economic assistance. Nor can it be assumed that this declaration of policy will cause them to cease reversionist activities once and for all. We will therefore have to pursue a policy of being, on the one hand, firm and clear about our intentions to control the islands for many more years and, on the other, of making our presence in the islands appear more clearly advantageous to the interests and well-being of the Ryukyuan people.

The Ryukyus have one of the highest population densities in the world, greatly exceeding that of Japan, and have almost no natural resources and very limited industries. The standard of living (which has greatly improved under US administration) depends almost entirely on the expenditures of US forces stationed in the Ryukyus. These expenditures finance the great bulk of food, fuel, machinery and other necessities and they provide a major source of employment. Two immediate difficulties arise from this situation. In the first place, despite vigorous efforts by the US Civil Administration and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands to expand agricultural and fishery resources and to develop industries, the eventual decline of US base construction in the islands will, unless offset by some other means, strike a heavy blow at the islands' economy. Secondly, the immediate economic benefits from our administration do not permeate down to the bulk of the Ryukyuan people in forms they adequately appreciate.

That the economic well-being of the islands is a by-product of our military bases is unfortunate; a garrison economy is an uncertain one at best. The economic future of the Ryukyus must be independently planned, native

industries developed, and the islands placed on a progressively more self-sustaining basis. This will call for more productive utilization of funds brought into the Ryukyuan economy through US payments for requisitioned land, more capital than is now attracted from foreign sources, and a carefully conceived US aid program. Well planned and vigorous development is not only an economic necessity but is a political "must" for maintaining a climate which will permit us to continue our all-important military mission in the Ryukyus. There are opportunities in the Ryukyus which, if properly grasped, could offset to a large extent the inherent liabilities of our position.

Wise administration and careful basic economic planning are fundamental, and every effort should be made to dramatize economic development in the public eye. In this connection, it is recommended that the United States Government re-examine the proposal made by the Special Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee for developing a nuclear power grid on Okinawa. This proposal commends itself on grounds both of military and economic advantage, as well as for the dramatic impact which the peaceful use of nuclear power would have in a military bastion like Okinawa. Already there are signs (such as the recent unanimous Ryukyuan legislature resolution opposing the siting of nuclear weapons in the Ryukyus) of Ryukyuan reaction against our "atomic presence." The above proposal would appear to be an effective way of counteracting nuclear phobia, such as is now prevalent in Japan.

There is a strategic and military problem related to our deployments in Okinawa. The island is small and was crowded with important installations of all three services even before the decision to withdraw units from Japan, some of which are scheduled for Okinawa. This concentration of a major military potential with a limited ground-to-air and antisubmarine defense

capability makes a highly attractive and vulnerable target, particularly in view of the known Soviet missile capabilities and the ever-increasing military power of Red China. Further deployments to Okinawa will only aggravate this situation; conversely, it would seem desirable that consideration be given to gradual redeployment of appropriate units to other possible areas in the Far East in order to achieve greater flexibility and more adequate dispersion.

Other problems in the Ryukyus, though posing serious immediate irritants, are not of such long-range significance as those described above. While it is true that the land problem has been one of our major headaches in the islands, the formula for compensation (a lump-sum payment 16 times the computed annual rental) is being put into effect and little further major land acquisition seems indicated. Certain labor problems will diminish with increased vocational training for Ryukyuan who are now replacing as rapidly as possible skilled workers previously imported from Japan and the Philippines to work on our base construction programs. However, labor difficulties can be expected to continue until wages are raised and inhibitions on labor organizations reduced. Moreover, should there be a considerable decline in military building and spending, the resultant unemployment could have some sharp repercussions on the Ryukyuan scene.

{source ; *Documents of the National Security Counsel, Fifth Supplement*,  
University Publications of America, microfilm, reel no.3 ; Rikkyo University  
Library, Tokyo}

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Research Fund.}