

資 料

## ロバート・F・ケネディ司法長官来日

Attorney General Robert Kennedy's Visit to Japan

吉 次 公 介

### I 解 説

1961年、ジョン・F・ケネディ (John F. Kennedy) がアメリカ合衆国大統領に就任した。若く優秀なスタッフを揃えたケネディ政権は、アメリカ社会に新たな風を吹き込んだ。

だが、ケネディ政権が直面した国際情勢は、厳しいものだった。若い大統領に対して、ソ連のフルシチョフ (Nikita S. Khrushchev) はベルリンで揺さぶりをかけてきた。結局、このベルリン危機は、ベルリンの壁の構築という形で収束するが、米ソ関係は厳しいままだった。ケネディは、ピッグス湾事件で大きな失敗を経験し、さらに東南アジア情勢の不安定化にも対応を迫られていた。

日米関係も、予断を許さなかった。1960年の安保改定をめぐる日本国内の大混乱は、アイゼンハワー米大統領の訪日中止という結果をもたらしていた。ケネディ政権は、そのアジア戦略において、日本をインドと並ぶ重要な拠点と位置付けており、同政権にとって日米関係の修復は、取り組むべき課題の一つだった。

他方、安保改定の混乱の責任をとって辞任した岸信介首相の後を継いで、1960年に政権についた池田勇人首相も、日米関係を修復しなければならないと考えていた。1961年に池田が訪米し、ケネディ大統領と「ヨット会談」を行い、「イコール・パートナーシップ」を謳いあげたのは、両国の良好な関係を印象付けるものだった。この池田＝ケネディ会談後、日米は貿易経済合同委員会の開催や、文化学術交流の促

進など、協力関係を発展させていった<sup>1)</sup>。

そうしたなか、1962年2月、ロバート・F・ケネディ (Robert F. Kennedy) 司法長官<sup>2)</sup> が日本を訪問し、約一週間にわたって滞在した。それは、ケネディ大統領の決定によってロバートがアジアとヨーロッパの各国を訪れる「親善旅行」の一環だった。ケネディ大統領は、この親善旅行によって、ロバートを「世界のリーダー達のグループ」に紹介し、ロバートの「外交政策を担う資格」を証明しようとしたのだった<sup>3)</sup>。

ロバートは、ケネディ大統領の弟であったことから、政権の意思決定に際して、司法長官という職責以上の役割を担っていた。ケネディ大統領は、外交政策の決定にあたって、ロバートの意見を重視していたといわれる。そのロバートの来日は、日本では「大統領の“名代”としての視察旅行の色彩」を強く持つものと受け止められていた<sup>4)</sup>。

ロバート・ケネディ訪日は、彼が早稲田大学で演説した際のエピソードでよく知られる<sup>5)</sup>。ロバートの演説中に罵声を浴びせていた一部の学生が、講演後の質疑応答を妨害するという事件が起きたのである。ロバートはこれに対して冷静に対応し、民主主義社会において自由に意見を交換することがいかに重要であるかを説き、事態を収拾させたのだった。ロバートの冷静な対応は、日本国内でも大変好意的に受け止められた。

だが実は、ロバートが日本のリーダー達とどのような議論を交わしたのかはほとんど知られていない。そこで、最近公開された日米両政府の機密文書のなかから、

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1) 池田政権期の日米関係については、樋渡由美『戦後政治と日米関係』(東京大学出版会、1990年)、松岡完「幻影のパートナーシップ」(麻田貞雄・細谷正宏編『日米外交史の研究』同志社大学アメリカ研究所、1995年)、拙稿「池田＝ケネディ時代の日米安保体制」(日本国際政治学会編『国際政治』第126号、2001年)などがある。

2) ロバート・ケネディについての基本的な文献として、Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (1978; Houghton Mifflin, N.Y.) や James W. Hilty, *Robert Kennedy; Brother Protector* (1997; Temple University Press, Philadelphia) がある。

3) Hilty, *Robert Kennedy*, op.cit., pp.437-440.

4) 『朝日新聞』1962年2月3日、夕刊。

5) 例えば、Shuleginger の *Robert Kennedy and His Times* は、RFKの訪日について論じた部分の大半をこの事件に割いている (op.cit., pp.563-566)。Hilty の *Robert Kennedy* も同様である (op.cit., pp.437)。

ロバート・ケネディと池田首相らとの会談記録を紹介したいと思う。それは、ロバート・ケネディ訪日がいかなる意義を持っていたのかを検証するための基礎となるだろう。

詳しい会談内容については以下に掲載する資料に譲り、ここでは、沖縄に関する問題についてのみ、簡単に触れておきたい。

ロバート・ケネディ訪日にあたり、沖縄問題について注目すべき発言をしたのは、田中角栄・自民党政調会長である。田中は「日本が軍備を合憲とするような、しかるべき憲法改正を行わない限り、日本国民は沖縄返還を期待できない。もしアメリカが沖縄返還を望んだとしても、軍備と特に核兵器の保持を禁じている憲法は、それを不可能とするだろう」と述べたのである<sup>6)</sup>。即ち田中は、軍備増強と憲法改正に向けたテコとして、沖縄返還を利用する考えを示したのである。よく知られるように、池田首相は急速な軍備増強や憲法改正には消極的な姿勢を見せていた。それは、社会党や世論の動向を見極めたうえでの判断でもあった。軍備増強・憲法改正推進論者から見れば、池田政権期は、それらを政治目標とした岸政権期よりも明らかに後退していた。田中は、こうした軍備増強・憲法改正に向けた閉塞感を打破しようとしたのだろう。

だが、この田中発言は、国会とメディアで問題視され、池田も沖縄返還と再軍備や憲法改正は別の問題であるとしたうえで、田中の発言を「個人的なもの」と述べた<sup>7)</sup>。田中の発言は、政治情勢を軍備増強や憲法改正に向けさせることはできなかったのだ。

自民党代議士のなかで、田中以外に沖縄問題について発言をしたのは、山中貞則だった。山中は、「できるだけ早い沖縄の統治権の返還という日本側の希望を明らかにした」のである。さらに山中は、首里高校が沖縄の高校として初めて甲子園に出場し、球場の土を持ち帰ろうとしたところ、沖縄の米軍当局がそれを許可しなかったエピソードをロバートに紹介し、それを大統領に伝えるよう求めた<sup>8)</sup>。

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6) "Summary of Discussion with Businessmen and Politicians", 1962.2.6, RG84, Records of the U.S. Foreign Service Posts, box82, National Archives II, College Park, MD.

7) 『朝日新聞』1962年2月7日。

8) "Summary of Discussion with Businessmen and Politicians", *op.cit.*

革新勢力も沖縄問題を取り上げた。成田知己・社会党委員長はアメリカの沖縄統治は「正当化できない」ものであり、「基本的な変化が必要」だと述べた。民社党は、「できるだけ早い」施政権の返還を求める一方、「世界のパワー・バランスを崩し、世界平和に脅威をもたらす」ような「非現実的な」即時返還を求めているのではないと述べた<sup>9)</sup>。ここで注目すべきは、革新勢力が必ずしも即時返還を強く主張しているわけではないことである。アメリカ側も、革新勢力の要求は概して「穏やか」なものであり、革新勢力が「非現実的な沖縄の即時返還を求めているのではないことは明らか」だと理解していた<sup>10)</sup>。戦後保守政権がアメリカの沖縄統治を基本的に是認していたことはよく知られるが、革新勢力の沖縄観も今後明らかにする必要があるだろう。

沖縄問題について、ロバートは、①池田＝ケネディ会談で、沖縄に対する日本の姿勢は示されている、②ケイセン報告によって、沖縄の状況は改善されるだろう、そして③訪日時に聞いた沖縄に関する日本側の感情を大統領に伝える、と回答した。アメリカ側自身が認めるように、ロバート・ケネディが日本国民に「約束したのは、沖縄に関する彼らの要求を大統領に伝えることだけだった」のである<sup>11)</sup>。

この沖縄問題を含めて、ロバート・ケネディ司法長官の来日は、日米関係史上、いかなる意義があったのだろうか。今後の課題としたい。

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9) "Summary of Discussion with Businessmen and Politicians", 1962.2.6, *op.cit.*

10) Embassy Tokyo, 1962.2.28, "Visit of Attorney General to Japan, February 4-10, 1962", RG84, Records of the U.S. Foreign Service Posts, box82, National Archives II, College Park, MD.

11) Embassy Tokyo, 1962.2.28, "Visit of Attorney General to Japan, February 4-10, 1962", *op.cit.* なお、ケイセン報告とは、池田＝ケネディ会談の結果、ケネディ大統領が派遣したカール・ケイセン氏を団長とする沖縄調査団の報告書である。ケイセン報告については、宮里政玄『日米関係と沖縄 1945-1972』（岩波書店、2000年）の第六章を参照のこと。

## II 資料

### 1. "Visit of Attorney General to Japan, February 4-10, 1962"

AmEmbassy TOKYO 731

February 28, 1962

VISIT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL TO JAPAN, FEBRUARY 4-10, 1962

#### I. EVALUATION AND SUMMARY

The visit to Japan of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and Mrs. Kennedy in February 1962 commanded the attention of more people and elicited a more positive response from the Japanese public than any good will visit in Japan's history. The flood of goodwill generated by the visit will eventually subside, but some lasting impressions were created which are thought to have: strengthened the sense of partnership between the two nations, made it some what more difficult for the leftist leadership to pursue an anti-American line without courting isolation from their own masses, and rendered the generality of Japanese less inflammable on such issues as trade restrictions, Okinawa, and even possibly nuclear testing.

The initial (and perhaps also the most lasting) impression on the Japanese people at large was made less by what the Attorney General said than by what he (and Mrs. Kennedy) did, the pace at which they did it, and their attitude and personality—and by the unprecedented efforts that all Japanese mass communications media made to convey these things to their audiences.

Japanese generally received a new and vivid sense of the dynamism and vigor of the United States Government and the American people. Another very general reaction, from which there is no significant dissent, is that the efforts of the Attorney General to get off the beaten track and meet with Japanese of all strata gave to millions of ordinary people a real sense of intimacy, of contact, of communicating with America, even if only vicariously.

The most remarkable success of the visit was the impression conveyed to the youth of Japan (and to their elders) of the willingness of Americans, under the democratic concept, to tolerate the expression of divergent opinions, and the contrasting intolerance of the Communists. This point was convincingly demonstrated at Waseda University, where the Attorney General won a moral victory over Communist hecklers, and less dramatically, in Kyoto, where Zengakuren boycotted a student discussion session. The pro-communist student movement faces a new revulsion against tactics such as followed the anti-Security Treaty demonstrations of 1960.

In his contacts with labor and the political left, the effect on the rank and file was probably more significant than that on the leadership. The Attorney General scored some telling points in his debates with JSP and Sohyo leaders, and seeds of doubt as to the validity of the current line on American imperialism may have been sown in the minds of some of the current line on American imperialism may have been sown in the minds of some of the leftist leaders, but this is probably less significant than the flourishing growth of friendship that sprang up in factories visited by the Attorney General, or wherever the newspapers and television sets brought scenes of the Attorney General rubbing elbows or shaking hands with

workers and the common people.

Though less striking than the impact of the visit on emotions, “images,” and attitudes, the hearing accorded the Attorney General’s verbal message was in its own way unprecedented. For a week or more, the American position on trade, nuclear testing, Okinawa, and other issues was laid out before the public, and the positive message of America’s special respect for Japan, America’s commitment to a free and open world society, with room for dissent and respect for the independence and sovereignty of others, and with hope for cooperative solutions for the problems of economic development and the conquest of poverty, disease, and space was stated and restated.

Japanese Government leaders and conservative politicians and businessmen responded with warmth to the Attorney General and to the reassurances which he brought them as to the basic trend in US policy toward lower tariffs, despite his repeated acknowledgements of difficult and perhaps insoluble specific problems.

The coincidence of the visit with the passage of reversionist resolutions by the Okinawan Legislature drew inordinate attention to the question of Okinawa. The Attorney General’s stand, that the president understood the feelings of the Japanese about Okinawa, and that the Kaysen Report would lead to improvements, though not to the return of Okinawa, was well-received. The suggestion was put to the Attorney General by LDP Policy Board Chairman Kakuei TANAKA that the US offer to return administrative rights to Japan if Japan would make possible the guarantee of US base rights through appropriate constitutional revisions. This invitation to intervene in Japan’s internal affairs, though later disavowed, raised a storm of criticism of Tanaka—and a round of applause for the

Attorney General's comment that constitutional revision and rearmament were affairs for the Japanese people and Government to decide.

On balance, as one Japanese newspaper commented, the only 'promise' the Attorney General gave to the Japanese people was to "convey their desires concerning Okinawa to the President."

(For an understated but perceptive Japanese assessment of the Attorney General's visit, see Asahi's comment, Enclosure 1, for a more sober assessment, Enclosure 2.)

## II. BACKGROUND

The Political Context: As of 1961, if there was one free nation that needed to have its youth, intellectuals and laborers convinced that America is working for the kind of world worth living in and believing in, that nation is Japan. The anti-Security Treaty demonstrations of 1960 had dramatically revealed the extent to which outdated Marxist concepts, the psychological hangover of the Occupation, and irresponsible notions of what freedom meant had rendered Japanese intellectuals and youth susceptible to manipulation by a dedicated, well-financed Communist minority.

There were indications of receptivity to American influence. A revulsion had set in after the anti-Security Treaty excesses, and even from across the Pacific, the youth and vigor of the new Administration had awakened some response; the appointment of a new Ambassador with a special rapport with youth and intellectuals was welcomed as the beginning of a new. The press gave encouraging signs of moderation and responsibility, most notably during the visit of Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas MIKOYAN

in August 1961, by rebutting his crude attacks on the Japan-US alliance. However, the patient efforts of the Communists to exploit irritations and issues such as the US military presence, Okinawa, and trade difficulties were taking their toll.

It was not the Government or the conservatives generally that needed convincing. Prime Minister Hayato IKEDA and his “strong-man” cabinet, installed following his return from his talks with President Kennedy in June, 1961, were uniquely committed to the new partnership with the United States. The GOJ cooperated wholeheartedly, not only in the initial meeting of the Joint Committee on Economics and Trade at Hakone, but also in the Scientific Conference of December, 1961, and the Cultural Conference of January, 1962. The impact of the two latter conferences on attitudes among Japanese intellectuals was very considerable. But conservative Japanese leaders were (and are) still concerned about the gap between the masses of Marxist-influenced elements of the left and the rest of the Japanese people.

In the circumstances, the idea of a visit to Japan by the Attorney General, as the most appealing symbol of the freshness of the new United States Administration, was a natural one. It was discussed by Ambassador Reischauer and the Attorney General in June, 1961. From the start it was realized that in order to reach down to the target groups, a visit at least partially under private auspices would be necessary. This point was also clear to many in the Japanese Government, and it went along readily with a plan whereby the visit would be in response to invitations by Dr. Gunji HOSONO, a long-time friend of the President and the Attorney General, Diet Member Yasuhiro NAKASONE, and the Japanese Young People's Committee for Better International Understanding (i.e., the “RK Committee”),

as well as by Chief Cabinet Secretary Masayoshi OHIRA, and Justice Minister Koshiro UEKI.

The “RK Committee”: Public Relations: No one in Japan, even a few weeks before the Attorney General’s visit, had any clear idea of the magnitude of the thing that was about to happen. A small group of executive members of the “RK Committee” probably came closer than anyone. To describe in any detail this amorphous group, which eventually grew to comprise some hundred and ten members and advisers (identified in Enclosure 3, List of Persons Met by Kennedys), would be a waste of space, but a word about the motives and contributions of a few key members is relevant. More than anyone else, except the Attorney General himself, they were responsible for the broad public impact of the visit. The RK Committee spent some ten million yen on the visit, and one of the finest testimonials to its success is the fact that the Committee considers the money well spent.

Yasuhiro Nakasone, prime mover of the RK Committee and probably the most ambitious of Japan’s younger politicians, wants to be Japan’s first popularly-elected Prime Minister. If he were able to campaign for office freely (under Japanese law he is not), he would plan campaign activities much like the events scheduled for the Attorney General. In effect, Nakasone wanted to create the broadest possible mass demand for political leadership with the qualities of youth, vigor, and dynamism. As a member of the faction of Ichiro KONO, Nakasone tends in any case to be anti-bureaucratic; but the reason why he fought so hard to limit the Government’s share of the Attorney General’s schedule was that he wanted to enhance the mass impact of the visit. For the same reason, he was quick to see the desirability of scheduling eye-catching, youthful, vigorous, and

dynamic events (such as the Aikido exhibition and ice-skating party of February 2) in the early morning hours.

For all his political acumen, Nakasone by himself would have been as much a hindrance as a help to the public-relations success of the visit. Japanese mass communications media are pathologically suspicious of the efforts of conservative politicians to get themselves in the public eye, and one of the major dangers was that the visit might be regarded by the press as a publicity stunt of Nakasone's. Nakasone was conscious of the danger, and generally acted with restraint, though he was under great pressure from his own political hierarchy to extract more "face" for the faction. Also, other members of the RK Committee were on the alert, sometimes excessively so, against political use of the visit by Nakasone. Chairman Tokusaburo KOSAKA, for example, tried to have the Aikido exhibition dropped from the schedule. Nakasone was occasionally at the point of blows with Kinosuke IWABORI, publisher of Heibon.

The balance-wheel role of these other members of the Committee were important, but the greatest positive contribution to the public relations impact of the visit (apart from Nakasone's), was that of political commentator Kazushige HIRASAWA, who, together with the woman writer Michiko INUKAI, planned this aspect of the visit. (Neither was salaried; indeed, they were asked to contribute 100,000 yen apiece to the Committee, but refused). Hirasawa is a friend of Nakasone, though he is by no means a follower. Hirasawa, for example, was helpful in persuading Nakasone to abandon his efforts to get the Attorney General to meet with one of Kono's financial backers, Tatsunosuke TAKASAKI, an event which would have created the public impression that the visit was being exploited for factional political purposes.

Hirasawa summed up his concept of the purposes of the visit in a conversation one evening with Nakasone, "Racially and culturally, the Japanese people have a feeling of closeness to the Chinese, which is an asset to the Communists. I want this visit to give the Japanese a sense of intimate contact with this important American, to make them feel 'Why he is one of us;'" It was Hirasawa who planned the extraordinarily intensive series of television and press interviews to present the Attorney General to the Japanese public in this light.

Other members of the RK Committee, aside from their desire for good relations with the US, had other motives, such as the acquisition of face, the desire to promote Japanese-American friendship as a favorable climate for particular solutions to problems such as those in the trade field, Kazuaki FUJIKAWA's desire to stimulate the non-Communist youth movements he backs, or Eiichi NAKAO's political ambitions (he is talking about filing for election to the Upper House in the coming elections).

But the motives that largely governed planning and advance publicity for the visit were those of Nakasone and Hirasawa. By the beginning of February, everyone who knew anything about the Attorney General's visit knew that he was following an unprecedentedly heavy schedule, with events beginning at six a.m., and that he was getting off the beaten track of Government guests in an effort to meet the ordinary people of Japan (see Enclosure 4 for a sample of the line followed in the advance publicity put out by the RK Committee).

### III. IMPACT ON NAJOR GROUPS

Government and Conservatives: The Attorney General's schedule, although

predominantly under private auspices, brought him into contact with representatives of virtually all segments of conservative Japan and exposed him to most of the opinions represented in the Government and the LDP.

As with the general public impact of the visit, the most important thing about the Attorney General's exchanges with the conservative leaders of Japan was less what he said than the way he spoke and conducted himself. A real sense of rapport, of intimate contact with the New Frontier, was established, not only with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Justice Minister, and the younger political leaders with whom the Attorney General had extended discussions, but with MITI Minister Eisaku SATO, Diet Speakers KIYOSE and MATSUNO, and other officials and businessmen with whom the Attorney General met briefly and informally (see, for instance, the comments of industrialist Konosuke MATSUSHITA, Enclosure 36).

The Attorney General's visit may have important indirect effects on the conservative leadership, apart from the rapport he established and the reassurances he conveyed. A public demand for more vigorous and dynamic political leadership was created. The efforts of Nakasone and others to capitalize on this demand may or may not succeed, but there is bound to be some ferment.

There is no indication as yet that anyone in the LDP is seriously considering an aggressive effort to alter past relationships with labor, but the example of the Attorney General's easy rapport with laborers and union representatives may start someone in the LDP reflecting on whether it is after all politically wise to do such things as passing a minimum wage law on the basis of hearings with management alone.

Opposition and Labor: At least in the short run, the effect of the Attorney General's visit on the left-wing political and labor movement will probably be more important among the rank and file than among the leadership.

The attitude of the non-Communist left was on the whole one of well-disposed neutrality, before, during, and after the visit. There was even talk in October of Tomomi NARITA's serving on the RK Committee. The idea was (wisely) abandoned, as the Suzuki Mission to Communist China and the JSP Convention took the Party even further leftward; but the leftists' attitude never became one of hostility. At any rate, in his discussion meetings with the left-wing leaders (with JSP politicians February 6 and with Sohyo and Churitsu Roren representatives on February 9), the Attorney General achieved astonishingly good rapport with them, considering the fact that in each case he scored some telling points against their commitment to outmoded concepts of Marxism-Leninism and their partiality to the Soviet Union. However, Sohyo and JSP leaders have lived long enough in the unreal world of Marxist-Leninist doctrine to develop ways of coping with occasional intrusions of reality. For example, the Sohyo organ paper's account of Secretary General Akira IWAI's meeting with the Attorney General (Enclosure 44) betrays some attempts to adjust the record of the discussions. (Where Iwai had actually told the Attorney General that the great majority of the 14 million who voted for the opposition parties in 1960 favored Japan's neutrality and opposed the Security Treaty (see Enclosure 43; tape recording also available), the organ paper has him telling the Attorney General that the majority of the Japanese people long for neutrality; where Iwai had acknowledged that the CPUS had not been "out-lawed" in the US, the organ paper deliberately obfuscates this point).

It would be cynical to discount entirely the possibility that Narita, Iwai, and the others might have received some influence through their contact with the Attorney General which in time make itself felt, particularly if Iwai accepts the Attorney General's insistent invitation to visit the United States again. However, it would be naive to count heavily on this.

There is a better chance that the leftist leaders will be affected by the very broad impact of the Attorney General's visit upon their rank and file. The historical tendency of the JSP to move to the left before Party conventions, and to the right before general elections, is an indication that the rank and file Socialist voters are less insulated from reality than their leaders. The fact that very large numbers in the rank and file now have a conception of the United States which is harder than ever to square with the notion of America as the imperialistic "common enemy of the Chinese and Japanese people" may exert some influence on the leadership in the coming months. This is particularly so in view of the contrast between the Attorney General's visit and that of MIKOYAN, a contrast which was not lost on Japanese workers.

Mikoyan, in his contacts with workers and Japanese in general, was obviously preoccupied with political matters, with his frontal attack on the US-Japanese alliance, and showed very little interest in working conditions, etc. When Mikoyan departed from his formal schedule, it was for a call on Prime Minister HATOYAMA's widow, or a meeting with conservative industrialists interested in trade with the USSR. The Attorney General, by contrast, started talking knowledgeably about working conditions and labor union activities whenever he came into speaking distance of a laborer. When he went off the beaten track, as he did constantly, it was to mingle

with workers, labor union people, students or intellectuals in their own environment. The "one of us!" reaction was most pronounced among these people.

The effect of the Attorney General's visit on the moderate left of Zenro and the DSP was considerable, in terms of personal impact both on the leadership and the rank and file, but its effect on the direction of the movement is more problematic even than the impact on the JSP and Sohyo. Zenro and the DSP gave to occupy whatever middle ground is left to them by the LDP on the one hand and the JSP on the other. If the JSP and Sohyo are moved to the right as the result of the Attorney General's visit, the moderates' field of maneuver will be further narrowed. Zenro, as Takita told the Attorney General on February 9 (Enclosure 43) hopes to exert an influence on the direction of the Japanese labor movement out of proportion to its relatively small membership, by virtue of the ideological dissensions in Sohyo. Only if the leftist leadership of Sohyo gets too far out of step with reality (as seen by the rank and file) will the growing numbers of those in Sohyo who Takita believes are dissatisfied with the doctrines of Marx and Lenin increase still further, and Zenro benefit.

Youth and Students: The Attorney General delivered a 25-minute address before a student audience of 20,000 at Nihon University. He met with leaders of non-Communist youth organizations in a widely reported luncheon. His roundtable with students in Kyoto was also well covered in all media. Doubtless these contacts, together with the general impact of the Attorney General's visit, would have exercised a considerable influence on the student's image of the US. Japanese generally, and students in particular, have a high resistance to lecturing or sermonizing. Nevertheless, the Attorney General's stress on the differences between the democratic

system, with its tolerance of dissent, and the Communist system, which demands submission to a central authority, awakened an intellectual response wherever he spoke to students. Whether his iteration of the themes of the heavy responsibilities that democracy entails, to one's neighbors and to one's country, got a similar response is harder to say. His patient answers to their questions about Okinawa, nuclear testing, Communist China, and the rest had the convincing ring of sincerity.

But all of the Attorney General's other contacts with Japanese youth (indeed, most other events on his schedule) were overshadowed by the tremendous impact of his appearance at Waseda University, an event which made most of his points by emotional, rather than intellectual, means. So much interest surrounds this incident that a detailed memorandum prepared by Mr. Sen NISHIYAMA, the USIS employee who interpreted for the Attorney General on this and other occasions, is enclosed, to provide at least one detailed and objective first-hand version (Enclosure 28; Sohyo's weekly Shin Shukan published a collection of highly prejudiced and mutually contradictory first-hand accounts: This is being forwarded separately.)

Essentially, so far as the public impact was concerned, what happened at Waseda was this: A discussion session with students was disrupted by the heckling of determined Communist minority, who set up an uproar during the Attorney General's opening remarks. The Attorney General invited the chief heckler to the platform and offered to answer any questions he might have. Instead of asking a question, the Communist delivered a harangue, and when he was finally persuaded to stop for a reply by the Attorney General, the microphone went dead, while the Communist launched into a new tirade. Without loss of temper or composure, the

Attorney General waited until a portable public address system was brought, when he again attempted to get the Communist to enter into a rational discussion. Only after this offer to debate had again been rejected did the Attorney General, still without rancor, coolly turn his back on the Communist and invite other students to the platform. With the Ambassador acting as unofficial moderator and helping maintain at least a semblance of order, the Attorney General answered one or two questions and made some remarks on the importance of the free exchange of views in a democratic society. The audience, by this time, was overwhelmingly on the side of the Attorney General and against the Communist minority, and the affair ended with a rendition of the school song, which drowned out alike the Communist hecklers and those who were counter-heckling the Communists.

Much of the Monday morning quarterbacking of the Waseda affair starts from the mistaken premise that it would have been better if it had been more orderly; that is, if the Communists had been prevented from infiltrating as many hecklers as they did (some of them from other universities), or if Yuzo TACHIYA (the ringleader) had not been invited to the platform, or had been thrown off as soon as the microphone went dead. These ideas are nonsense. The Nihon University appearance, by way of contrast, was civil and orderly, and considerable thought had gone into the speech delivered there, but in this classified despatch it is possible to confess frankly that it added to the broader impact of the Attorney General's visit. Few Japanese could tell you today what the speech was about even in the most general terms.\* Almost every politically conscious Japanese could

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\*There was at least one notable exception, a 23-year old man who read the speech in the Japan Times and was inspired to write a letter so good that it is transmitted as Enclosure 56.

recite the lesson of Waseda.

It was precisely because the Communists at Waseda were every bit as objectionable as they were, and the Attorney General (and the Ambassador and the two wives) as tolerant and good-humored as they were, that the point was driven home so thoroughly. In little over an hour, the moral superiority of the Attorney General—and the free society he stood for—had been convincingly demonstrated for millions of Japanese to see. The stage had been set for a new revulsion against Communist influence among the students which may prove comparable to the revulsion that set in 1960 after the weeks and months of excesses against the Security Treaty.

#### IV. THE VERBAL MESSAGE: ISSUES DISCUSSED

Trade and Economic Relations: The misgivings of Japan about “buy American” and “ship American” aspects of US aid and trade policy, the resentment of the Tariff Commission’s study of the cotton import equalization foe, the fear that the United States in adjusting its own relations with EEC might leave Japan out in the cold—these were evident from the time of the Attorney General’s conversations with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister on February 5 (Enclosures 11 and 13). As the Foreign Minister admitted, the money involved in the specific trade problems is small, less important than the psychological effect or the emergence of the problems so soon after the Hakone Conference. The extent of this psychological impact was made fully apparent.

The Attorney General’s response conveyed little new in the way of specific information. He reviewed frankly the problems facing the United States which made concern over Japanese imports and with measures to

protect the dollar inevitable, even though (as he stated in the most categorical way) the president is firmly committed to lowering trade barriers in general in spite of the political risks involved. With respect to the preferential treatment of US producers in AID purchases of fertilizer (which the Prime Minister said were disrupting the natural growth of export markets for Japan's cheaper problem), the Attorney General said over and over again that this particular problem might not be resolved to Japan's liking. On the cotton import equalization foe, the Attorney General's standard response was that the Tariff Commission was making a study (a perfectly natural act in the circumstances), that it would make recommendations to the President, and that he was free to accept or reject the recommendations. If this was a "hint," as the Wall Street Journal (and the organ paper of Zenro-see Enclosure 45) inferred, it was a hint that had been available to any reader of newspapers since long before the Attorney General's visit.

In regard to the "isolation" of Japan as the US moved closer to EEC, the Attorney General's repeated assurances (that the President attached great importance to trade and other relations with Japan, and that he had made vigorous efforts vis-a-vis the European countries to ensure that any benefits from reduction of trade barriers would be available in return for equivalent concessions equally to Japan and other countries) for the most part simply gave an authoritative personal cast to information that the Japanese could have derived for themselves from published sources.

Interest in Regional Cooperation: Apart from questions of trade and trade policy, great interest was evinced in the related matter of US-Japanese cooperation in regional economic development. The Prime Minister suggested that more attention be given to the development of an Asian

Economic Community; he also urged US-Japan cooperation in aid to Burma. LDP Diet Policy Committee Chairman Masumi ESAKI raised the old idea of the United States' using Japan as its agent for the transmission of aid to Southeast Asia. Nakasone submitted an interesting "PROPOSAL ON ESTABLISHMENT OF A CIVIL JAPAN-US-CANADA JOINT RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON FORMING A PACIFIC ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL SPHERE," premised on the "historically inevitable" fact that "Japan, the US, Canada, Australia and possibly the Philippines and Indonesia should be united solidly into a single economic and cultural sphere" (Enclosure 48).

Without endorsing any particular approach, the Attorney General conveyed the impression of a very positive attitude toward US-Japanese partnership in the export to developing nations of the qualities that have been responsible for Japan's economic success.

Concern over Communist Offensive: The Attorney General was impressed by the depth of concern shown by some of the conservative leaders about the Communist cultural offensive in Japan (Enclosure 20). He pointed out that the New Administration has made considerable efforts to improve cultural interchange with Japan, but agreed that more was needed.

Nuclear Testing: Nuclear testing was brought up by members of almost every group with whom the Attorney General met, but most insistently by the leftists, who uniformly stressed their opposition to nuclear testing by anyone for any reason, and requested or demanded that the US not resume atmospheric testing. With equal insistence, the Attorney General reviewed the efforts of the United States since 1946 to realize effective international control not just of the manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons, but of

their transfer as well, and the manner in which the Soviets have frustrated these efforts. He told the JSP frankly that he couldn't see how, as a party supposedly interested in world peace and the well being of mankind, they could fail to support the United States position. About the future of US testing, he repeated the assurances given publicly by the President, that the US will not test for any reason other than absolute military necessity: and if it did become necessary, he hoped the Japanese people would understand, at least in their hearts. At least one Zenro man, a participant in the breakfast roundtable at the Miyako Hotel in Kyoto (Enclosure 39), admitted to a "theoretical" understanding of the US position.

Okinawa: Reversionist resolutions passed by the Okinawa Legislature shortly before the Attorney General's visit helped to ensure that the desire for the return to Japan of Okinawa, of at least of administrative rights, would be expressed by virtually all groups of Japanese he come in contact with.

The suggestion of LDP Policy Board Chairman Kakuei TANAKA, that the US offer to return administrative rights in Okinawa to Japan if Japan would make possible the guarantee of US base rights through appropriate constitutional amendments, represented a partisan effort to exploit the Okinawa issue in the domestic fight over rearmament and other constitutional issues. It raised a storm in the Diet and press, was quickly disavowed by the Government party, and then termed "regrettable" by Tanaka himself. Tanaka's "slip of the tongue" and the background of it are of interest in the domestic political situation, but not germane to this despatch. So far as the opinions they expressed to the Attorney General went, the conservatives yielded to no one in their desire to get Okinawa back.

For their part, the representatives of the non-Communist left were relatively mild in their demands, making it clear that they were not demanding the unrealistic immediate return of Okinawa. Not only did the DSP indicate its understanding of the danger attendant upon the sudden shift in the world balance of power that would follow the abrupt return of Okinawa, but even Sohyo's Iwai spoke in terms of gradual improvements. He gave the High Commissioner good marks for rescinding the requirement that labor unions be registered, but asked that Japanese labor union representatives (i.e., Sohyo) be permitted freedom of travel to Okinawa.

Although Sohyo's organ paper found the Attorney General's reply on Okinawa "evasive," most questioners seemed not only satisfied but encouraged by the Attorney General's assurance that Japanese desires regarding Okinawa had been made plain to the President by Prime Minister Ikeda last year, that the Kaysen report would result in improvements, and that the Attorney General would report to the President the sentiments about Okinawa which he had encountered. The subsequent news that he had reported to the President further heightened Japan's anticipation of changes to come in the Okinawan situation.

Communist China: Little intensity of feeling on China policy was displayed in the sessions with the Attorney General, but certain themes kept coming up: the feeling that Communist China must sooner or later be recognized and seated in the UN, the feeling that the US was unfairly preventing Japan from dealing or trading with Communist China, and the thought that the US itself must eventually recognize Peiping, if certain conditions were satisfied. A Democratic Socialist, arguing that Communist China must be admitted to the UN for the sake of disarmament negotiations, was not too far apart from LDP Diet Policy Committee Chairman Masumi

ESAKI, who accused the United States of having “no policy” toward China. Conservatives who mentioned the pressures for trade with the China mainland as an aspect of current trade difficulties did not sound too different from Iwai of Sohyo, who hoped that the United States would understand the necessity of Japan’s expanding trade with the Soviet Union and Communist China. Nakasone asked at one session whether, if Communist China agreed to an exchange of newsmen, or released American prisoners, relations with Communist China would improve. Later the same day, at a meeting with non-Communist youth leaders, the question was asked whether the main condition for settlement of the China question were not Communist China’s renouncing its threat to Taiwan—accepting, that is, a “one China, one Taiwan” situation.

The Attorney General’s answers to these various points, that the United States policy toward Communist China’s membership in the UN is supported by a majority of the UN members; that the United States does not attempt to dictate the policies of other nations, each of which must decide for itself what to do about trade and recognition; and that the President is waiting for some indication that Communist China has abandoned its aggressive posture toward the US and its allies, gave his questioners little new information but put United States policy in a more acceptable perspective for some of them.

SMITH-MCCARRAN Act: Concern about the fate of the Communist Party of the US was expressed by Sohyo representatives and some individual workers and leftists, as well as the Communists themselves, who waved placards and submitted protests about the indictments under the McCarran Act. The concern, caused mostly by the efforts of the JCP, Sohyo, and other leftist groups to agitate the issue, seemed to involve in most cases the

misconception that the CPUS had been "outlawed," an idea which the Attorney General had to correct over and over again. Iwai had a more sophisticated understanding of the problem; he argued that the use of law, instead of public opinion or the polls, to control the Communists was a bad thing.

Security Treaty. Military Bases: All leftist groups indicated in some way their disapproval of the US-Japan military alliance and the military base structure that goes with it. Most of them seemed intent merely on registering their position, rather than on pressing specific demands. The JSP representatives did ask what the Attorney General thought about abrogating the Security Treaty in the JSP takes over, and when the Attorney General said surely they didn't mean to take the position that solemn treaties should be changed whenever there is an election, one of the Socialists said that was precisely what he did mean; but Narita explained that abrogation of the Treaty should be on the basis of prior discussions with the United States.

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## VI. ACTION REQUESTED

Department pass copies to USIA, Department of Justice, and Department of Labor.

For the Ambassador:

David L. Osborn  
First Secretary of Embassy

[出典；RG 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Japan, Tokyo Embassy, Classified General Records (1952-1963), Box 82, National Archives II, College Park, MD, U.S.]

## 2. 「池田総理, ロバート・ケネディー司法長官会談の件」

池田総理, ロバート・ケネディー司法長官会談の件

昭和37. 3. 5

アメリカ局北米課

2月4日来日したロバート・ケネディー司法長官は、2月5日午前8時30分池田総理を信濃町の自邸に訪問、約1時間にわたり会談した。会談内容以下のとおり。

なお、日本側よりは大平官房長官、宮沢議員、米側よりはライシャウアー大使、オズボン1等書記官が同席した。

1. まずケネディー長官より、ケネディー大統領の伝言として以下のとおり述べる。

(1) 今年の池田、ケネディー会談は非常に有益であつた。会談で設置をとりきめた経済閣僚委員会、科学委員会、教育文化委員会の3つの委員長をそれぞれ第1回会議を成功裡に開催して結構であつた。

(2) E E Cの発展及びE E Cと米国の接近は結果として日本にも helpful であると思う。

(3) 綿製品賦課金の問題はいろいろ議論もあるようだが、当面の問題は別として、米国の貿易政策の基本は関税引下の方向にある。

2. これに対し総理より、

(1) 日本の対米貿易上□〔一字不明〕の問題点は、たとえばA I D肥料買付で日本がしめ出されたことであり、かかることは日本側の全く納得しえざる点である。

(2) 米国の後進国援助の方式はマンネリズムに陥っている館あり、少し考える必要があるだろう。

と述べた。

3. ケネディー長官より、米国としても金の流出が厳しいのでいろいろの処置をとらざるをえなかった次第である。しかし自由貿易主義という基本的態度はくずしていない。後進国援助については、アジア、ラテン・アメリカ等で日本が米国のパートナーとして援助に協力しているのは結構なことである。援助の方式については、米国をいくつかの誤りをおかしているかも知れないが、今後はこれらの点を矯正して行きたい。と述べた。
4. 総理より、客年訪米の際ロックフェラー・ニューヨーク州知事と会見したが、そのときは時期尚早という意見を述べたことがあるが、先般アジア諸国を訪問した結果、共同体を成り立たせる可能性が大部出てきたと思うようになった。共同体の発足運営については、日米協力の分野がかなりあるのではないかと思つている。東南アジア諸国のうち米国は従来より援助その他についてインドに重点をおきすぎていると思う。たとえばビルマとかパキスタンにもっと援助を与えた方がいいのではないか。先般ビルマを訪問した際、オンジー準将と話す機会があったが、その話し合いよりえた印象は、ビルマの本心は反共であること、ビルマに対し援助の手をさしのべれば、ビルマは自由陣営についてくるであろうかも、もっと援助を与えてやるべきだということである。ウー・ヌー首相よりは、同国の千カ年経済計画について援助方依頼されているので、大来ミッションを送る予定である。と述べた。
5. ケネディー長官より、お話しはきわめて有益で、殊にビルマに対する見方は自分としても始めて伺つた次第で、その内容は大統領並びにハミルトンA I D長官にも伝えておくべし、世界情勢について自分の□〔一字不明〕るところを参考までお話しすると、トンプソン大使のモスコーにおけるアプローチについては種々伝えられているが、はつきりいって具体的成果は上つていない。ラオスにおける情勢はsettleする可能性があると思う。理由の1つをあげれば、ソ連としてもこの地域でゴタゴタすれば、結局中共を利するのかと考えているに違いないからである。ヴェトナムについては、米国の立場はdetermined to defendである。と述べた。
6. 総理より、ドンプソン大使のアプローチはたとえ具体的成果なしとする。アプローチしているということも自体が世界に対してよいデモンストレーションとな

るものであるから、引続いてやられんことを希望する。韓国についていえば、先般訪米して大統領と会談した際、大統領自身は韓国をなんとかしなければならぬという自分の意見に賛成してくれたが、フルブライト議員やヤンスフィールド議員が必ずしもそう思っていないとのことで、自分に直接説得方依頼されたことがある。そのときは自分にそのチャンスがなかつたので、貴長官が帰米されたなら両議員に自分の考えを伝えていただきたい。朴議長はしつかりした人間で、今の朴政権が倒れると韓国は共産化する危険がある。今が援助の最後のチャンスであると思う。と述べた。

7. ケネディー長官より、たしかに米国の議会方面では朴には懐疑的であったが、朴が渡米し各方面と接触した結果、この気持は消え去り Park is a man to stand up という印象を受けたようである。お話しの両議員とも今では事情を了解している。米国の朴議長に対する感じは大部変つてきている次第なり。と述べた。

〔出典；外務省外交記録 第17回公開 A'0401 外務省外交史料館所蔵〕

(本稿は、沖縄国際大学特別研究費による研究成果の一部である)